Seravel's+response

It is essential to note that a victorious war cannot be determined through a superiority of arms and men alone. The underlining key in claiming victory lies behind the effectiveness of the military strategy employed by an army as well as its style of leadership and determination to gain civilian support. The stability of its social and political conditions are sub factors in contributing to success in an overall campaign. The Chinese communists during the second Civil War (1946-1947) had fully demonstrated these aspects under the guidance of its leader Mao Zedong. This inevitably led to their triumph over the Nationalists in 1949 and consequently, achieving the party’s ultimate objective for the creation of a Communist state.

During the commencement of the Civil War historian Immanuel Tsu stated the that Nationalists military ‘//were confident of their ability to crush the enemy in a quick bout’//. Despite this assurance, the army could not match the military strategy of the enemy. In fact, Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang Supreme War council’s primary aim was to conduct aggressive frontal wars in order to defend the territory they had quickly gained. They had dismissed notions of the Communists encircling their troops and consequently, military forces were trapped and lost their mobility. Mao Zedong in 1929 had developed guerrilla principles and eventually exercised it during battle. He encouraged his army to strike behind enemy lines which contrasts to Chiang Kaishek’s orders for a head on warfare. The success of Mao’s tactics was confirmed by Nationalists Generals as they had observed that the ‘//Communists quickly and unhesitatingly disengaged from situations that were not to their advantage‘.// The People’s Liberation Army’s use of ‘Intelligence Gathering’ was another effective tactic employed as it enabled them to understand their present situation and more importantly, that of the enemy’s. With the Nationalists battle plan in their possession, the PLA could manoeuvre itself to attack on fronts where they could meet and defeat their enemy in their vulnerable state. Through the effectiveness of it’s strategy and tactics the PLA were able to capture the Nationalists capital of Nanking followed by Shanghai in 1949 which signalled their victory.

Leadership is another key aspect for the Communist Victory. The demoralization of the Nationalist army had opened the gate for the Communists success as their combat skills grew weak and consequently, their ability to fight could not resume. Chiang Kaishek had claimed //‘there is absolutely no way even through luck that we, the Nationalists can avoid defeat’.// Thus, the military leader himself felt pessimistic about victory. His poor leadership was evident through the performance of his army in the battle. A common occurrence within the army was the desertion of many troops. Even the death penalty for desertions that was implemented by military commanders did little to stop the increasing numbers of desertions. Freedom and independence for them was non existent and the failure of some campaigns was due to Chiang Kaishek interfering in the running of battles. This was the great disparity from Mao Zedong’s approach in how the PLA should undertake the war. He called for commanders to respond to the situation as they saw it, hence with the freedom given, troops were more willing to continue fighting the war. The Communists also made every effort to promote individual’s on the basis of their fighting ability. This gave civilians more chance and opportunity to be engaged in achieving success in the war and overall displaying their true patriotism for the nation.

A significant factor contributing to the fall of the Nationalist's was the party’s inability to keep in touch with the masses. The leaders of the Guomindang bypassed the social and economic programs which they had pledged themselves to carry out. Instead, leaders became power elite, focusing more on power itself and the benefits it would bring to them. Alternatively, Mao devised his own political theory that peasants could provide the main force for the communist revolution. He believed ‘//whoever solves the peasants problem would control China’// and this was the essential move to achieve his ultimate objective in a creation of a Communist state. Immanuel Tsu affirms Mao’s strategy in which he was willing to ‘//devote 70 percent of their energy to communist expansion, 20 percent to ‘coping with’ the Guomindang and 10 percent to be used against Japan’.// In order to gain peasantry support, the PLA operated according to a strict military code which called for the use of all Chinese courtesy towards ordinary civilians. As a result, the communist were highly regarded by the ordinary people who themselves had turned their support away from the Guomindang who had many accounts for their lack of humanity either revealed or witnessed by the citizens. The mass number of civilian support they had gained was due to success in convincing the peasants that the party could do better for them in the field of social justice and economic welfare.

The race for national unification between Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong ended on October 1 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was formally announced. The Communist Party through their sacrifices and determination had closed the stage of the revolutionary struggle which lasted for thirty eight years. The Communist victory itself, had proved that it is through military strategy, effective leadership and civilian support that a victory can be possible. The party leader Mao Zedong, through this momentous event has been noted in the history books as ‘//the true saviour of China’

Your essay is very clear, showing that you understand the topic well. Its argument is consistant and the use of historians is great. good girl =). //